My paper is a reply to Mr. Seungbae Park’s article, “Defence of Cultural Relativism” (Park, 2011), which holds that no culture is better than another. In response,my paper challenges the author’s method, fairly popular amongst some postmodern thinkers, that tends to equate cultural relativism and Einstein’s theory of relativity. Firstly, I question the general rationale of establishing an analogy between relativity and relativism. In my opinion, the analogy fails to take into accountthe very large generic distance between physics and ethics. (...) Secondly, I try to demonstrate that the analogy can be construed in two opposite ways, so that, on theone hand, it might support relativism, while on the other, it might reinforce cultural absolutism. Therefore, one would rather dispense with so equivocal an analogy. Finally, I suggest that besides cultural absolutism and cultural relativism there is also another way of assessing different cultures – I used to call it intrinsic comparison – which is based on the second options of groups and individuals rather than on their first options. The issue of how to successfully compare cultures by avoiding both absolutism and relativism was extensively dealt with by me elsewhere. (shrink)

Epicurus claimed that „all sensations are true”, and that the false is only in the opinions. This paradoxical theory, very much criticized both by ancient and modern commentators, for it seems counterfactual, draws on Aristotle’s theory of sensations. Aristotle holds that sensations and opinions must be distinguished. As long as sensations stick to their „proper domain”, they remain trustworthy and cannot refute each other, regardless of whether they are similar or different in kind. Yet they can fail to perceive the (...) truth, when they pass beyond their proper domain into what one can call their „improper domain”. At this moment sensations resemble opinions and become fallible. So, to a certain extent, the divide between sensations and opinions becomes blurred. Epicurus seems to have taken up much of this theory. Yet he submitted it to a radical simplification: now, there is no room for the „improper domain”, so that all one sensation seizes always belongs to its „proper domain”. Thus it can never be refuted neither by a similar, nor by a dissimilar sensation in kind; therefore it is always and in every circumstance trustworthy. One can add that, in reshaping Aristotle’s theory of senses by removing the „improper domain”, Epicurus purged the theory of senses of all elements that could involve uncertainty and imprecision – which is typical for his strenuous attempt to achieve calm and serenity. (shrink)

Notre article analyse deux passages curieux du traité Sur les difficultés relatives à l’âme III. De la vision (Enn. IV.5,3 et 8), dans lesquels Plotin paraît concevoir la possibilité d’un autre univers, situé en dehors du nôtre. Or, cet autre univers doit rester inconnu pour nous à jamais, quand bien même il y aurait un « oeil placé sur le dos du Ciel » qui voudrait le voir. En outre, nous ne saurons même pas décider si cet univers existe ou (...) non. En effet, explique Plotin, plusieurs univers ne peuvent absolument pas communiquer entre eux, précisément parce qu’ils forment des univers différents. S’ils communiquaient, ils seraient autant de parties du même univers et non pas des univers séparés, parce que la communication (la sympathie dans les termes de Plotin) circule seulement à l’intérieur du même univers. Nous rapprochons cet intéressant argument de certaines idées astrophysiques modernes et de la philosophie « des mondes possible » de David Lewis, sans pour autant pratiquer une lecture « modernisante » de Plotin. (shrink)

1 / On sait que pour Aristote la vertu est une moyenne entre deux vices extrêmes et opposés : l’un par défaut, l’autre par excès. Par exemple, le courage est l’art d’éviter aussi bien la lâcheté que la témérité en choisissant une moyenne située entre les deux. De même, on risque de s’écarter de cette autre vertu qu’est la générosité ou bien par défaut, et c’est...

The article calls in question the widely held opinion that Epicurus developed his concept of prolepsis as an empirical “alternative response” to the Platonic Forms. One tries to show that in fact the prolepsis and the Form produce two different types of knowledge and that their difference goes beyond the fact that the former is empirical while the latter is not: the prolepsis is based on recognition and strives to ascertain the identity of the perceived things, while the Form is (...) based on recollection and seeks to know what their essence or nature is. Recognition and recollection are phenomenologically quite different. However, it is still possible that the Epicurean prolepsis was indebted to Plato, but it was the Plato of the Theaetetus and Philebus rather than that of the Meno and Phaedo. So one holds that Epicurus developed a somehow marginal Platonic epistemology to which he assigned a central and basic role in his own epistemology (the Canon). (shrink)

The article calls in question the widely held opinion that Epicurus developed his concept of prolepsis as an empirical “alternative response” to the Platonic Forms. One tries to show that in fact the prolepsis and the Form produce two different types of knowledge and that their difference goes beyond the fact that the former is empirical while the latter is not: the prolepsis is based on recognition and strives to ascertain the identity of the perceived things, while the Form is (...) based on recollection and seeks to know what their essence or nature is. Recognition and recollection are phenomenologically quite different. However, it is still possible that the Epicurean prolepsis was indebted to Plato, but it was the Plato of the Theaetetus and Philebus rather than that of the Meno and Phaedo. So one holds that Epicurus developed a somehow marginal Platonic epistemology to which he assigned a central and basic role in his own epistemology (the Canon). (shrink)

The paper intends to study the possibility of evading the relativist dilemma: when you compare cultural forms belonging to different traditions, you either impose the result from outside, or you give up comparisons altogether as dependent on the arbiter’s parochial choices. In this paper one argues that, apart from this kind of comparison, which is called extrinsic, there is another type, called intrinsic, which is not dependent on arbiter’s choices. The essence of the intrinsic comparison is the role played by (...) the “second option” of the representatives of different traditions: it is decisive what these representatives prefer in the second place, when their first options have to be abandoned. Two old stories provide the historical paradigm of the intrinsic comparison: how Volga Khazarians are said to have converted to Judaism in the 8th century, and how the Athenian general Themistocles was voted the best general by the confederate Greek representatives. An example of contemporary intrinsic comparison between three contemporary trends – relativism, fundamentalism, rationalism – is also presented. Contrary to what Ernest Gellner believes, these trends are not incommensurable; rationalism takes precedence while being the second option of the other two trends, as soon as they want to enter a public debate. (shrink)

Paradox of the Evil and "Family Ressemblances". The paper tackles the problem of Matter and evil in Plotinus. monistic metaphysics, especially in theperspective of the following aparent inconsistency: if there is no other principle but the Good, then the Good creates the Matter which is the absolute evil. Itfollows that the Good is bad, according to a certain axiom of Proclus, which states that the creator is to a higher degree all what the creature is. The authorshows that, despite what (...) Proclus and then many modern critics believed, Plotinus is consistent within his system. He relies on the axiom that the creature is not all what the creator is, i.e. that the creator also gives what he has not. Therefore, the One gives the Intellect multiplicity and thought which He is deprived of and also gives the Matter the evil which He is also deprived of. The paper also shows that Plotinus developed a logic of ontological procession which is not Aristotelian. This logic does not work by formind classes, but chains of partially intransitive ressemblances. So, the Intellect ressembles the One (the Good), the Soul ressembles the Intellect and the Matter ressembles the Soul; yet the Matter resembles the One no more. Yet, the unity of the world is assured, because of the continuity of the chain. The extreme terms are contrary, though not in the Aristotelian sense of sharing in the same genus. A certain similarty with Wittgenstein's logic of "family resemblances" is striking, which means that not only Wittgenstein, but Plotinus also went beyond the Platonic-Aristotelian Vulgata, even while he was sticking to its linguage. (shrink)

Paradox of the Evil and "Family Ressemblances". The paper tackles the problem of Matter and evil in Plotinus. monistic metaphysics, especially in theperspective of the following aparent inconsistency: if there is no other principle but the Good, then the Good creates the Matter which is the absolute evil. Itfollows that the Good is bad, according to a certain axiom of Proclus, which states that the creator is to a higher degree all what the creature is. The authorshows that, despite what (...) Proclus and then many modern critics believed, Plotinus is consistent within his system. He relies on the axiom that the creature is not all what the creator is, i.e. that the creator also gives what he has not. Therefore, the One gives the Intellect multiplicity and thought which He is deprived of and also gives the Matter the evil which He is also deprived of. The paper also shows that Plotinus developed a logic of ontological procession which is not Aristotelian. This logic does not work by formind classes, but chains of partially intransitive ressemblances. So, the Intellect ressembles the One (the Good), the Soul ressembles the Intellect and the Matter ressembles the Soul; yet the Matter resembles the One no more. Yet, the unity of the world is assured, because of the continuity of the chain. The extreme terms are contrary, though not in the Aristotelian sense of sharing in the same genus. A certain similarty with Wittgenstein's logic of "family resemblances" is striking, which means that not only Wittgenstein, but Plotinus also went beyond the Platonic-Aristotelian Vulgata, even while he was sticking to its linguage. (shrink)

Cet article met en question une tendance postmoderne assez répandue: celle de reconstruire abusivement la signification d’un texte du passé, de telle façon que ce texte puisse jouer le rôle d’allié ou d’ennemi dans nos guerres idéologiques. L’exemple choisi c’est un article d’Umberto Eco - «Anti-Porfirio» ainsi qu’un chapitre parallèle de son livre Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language. Selon Eco, le fameux «Arbre de Porphyre» serait une illustration graphique de ce qu’il appelle «pensée forte». Or, cette pensée aurait été (...) minée depuis longtemps - affirme Eco - par la «pensée faible» qu’il retrouve dans la soi-disant «pensée encyclopédique», et ce sont déjà certains textes d’Aristote ou de Thomas d’Aquin, qui en attestent la présence. De plus, Eco pense avoir trouvé dans le Discours préliminaire d’Alembert, oeuvre qui préface l’Encyclopédie française, un devancier de la «pensée faible» postmoderne. Il s’apparente, selon lui, au «rhizome» décrit par G. Deleuze. Aussi cette «pensée encyclopédique» est-elle l’opposé même de la logique incarnée par l’antique «Arbre de Porphyre». L’article tâche de montrer qu’Umberto Eco a beaucoup déformé certaines idées des philosophes mentionnés là-dessus. En effet, il a tendance à discuter les textes pertinents hors de leur contexte métaphysique originaire, tout en en omettant certains aspects décisifs. D’après Eco, Thomas d’Aquin et surtout d’Alembert auraient anticipé le postmodernisme, ce qui, selon moi, n’est pas du tout le cas. Je crois que, en effet, Eco a donné moins une description tant soit peu fidèle d’un passé philosophique qu’une reconstruction relativement abusive de ce passé, légitimant ainsi ses propres vues philosophiques. (shrink)